...over the past twenty years, we have let
corporations into our polling places, locations so sacred to democracy
that in many
states even international election monitors and reporters are
banned. With the implementation of "black box voting" (the use of
electronic voting machines), these corporations are recording our
votes, compiling and tabulating them, and then telling us the total
numbers - and doing it all using "proprietary" hardware and
software that we cannot observe, cannot audit, and cannot control.
If the vote-counting corporation says candidate X or candidate Y
won the vote, we have no means of rebutting that, and they have no
way of proving it. We're asked simply to trust them. From Thom
Threshold pg 210.
One problem is that the tabulation software is
A private company owns the code to the count—and the privateers will
fight fiercely, with GOP help, to keep the ballot counting code their
commercial secret. Greg Palast (12/1/2016)
machines are uncertified, unstandardized, often produce no
audit trail, and are made by hard right-wing Republicans.
The US is
probably the only country in which election infrastructure is in
the hands of private partisans.
As if that were not enough of a problem, the source code for these machines is proprietary and is protected
a trade secret, so it is not available for audit. By accident, some
of it leaked out (Diebold's web site was not
U.S. elections have been
outsourced to (highly
partisan) private corporations.
Every study (from Princeton to GAO) concurs that
computerized voting is extremely vulnerable to manipulation.
Polling methodology has already morphed to account for
consistent "red shifts" in election results, so the polls mirror the
elections and everything looks consistent.
Ever wonder why voters seem to be voting against
their own interests, the Progressive agenda is DOA, and America looks
to be veering further and further Right ?
Diebold Source Code!!! --by ouranos (dailykos.com)
Rubin is currently Professor of Computer Science at John
Hopkins University. He 'accidentally' got his hands on a copy of
the Diebold software program--Diebold's source code--which runs
their e-voting machines. Dr. Rubin's students pored over 48,609
lines of code that make up this software. One line in particular
stood out over all the rest: #defineDESKEY((des_KEY8F2654hd4" All
commercial programs have provisions to be encrypted so as to
protect them from having their contents read or changed by anyone
not having the key... The line that staggered the Hopkins team was
that the method used to encrypt the Diebold machines was a method
called Digital Encryption Standard (DES), a code that was broken in
1997 and is NO LONGER USED by anyone to secure programs. F2654hd4
was the key to the encryption. Moreover, because the KEY was IN the
source code, all Diebold machines would respond to the same key.
Unlock one, you have then ALL unlocked. I can't believe there is a
person alive who wouldn't understand the reason this was allowed to
happen. This wasn't a mistake by any stretch of the
"On May 6, 2007 the House Administration Committee
a modified bill called HR 811, also known as the Holt bill. In that bill's
markup in committee, it got better and it got worse in various
particulars, if you follow the debate. One way in which it got much
worse is that instead of source code for the computer that would be
given away for any citizen's inspection, they committee put in
language that made the source code a government-recognized trade
secret, available only to "qualified" experts, and then only if
a strict nondisclosure agreement is signed that incorporates trade
secrecy laws of the states, which almost always contain harsh
punitive damages and attorneys fees clauses for violating the
This language is particularly ominous. I know of no
before that an American legislative body has ever tried to pass law
to reinforce secret vote counting. Of course, having a copy of the
source code does not tell us if that code is the same as what's
used on election day, nor does it tell us what the actual voting
computers are asked to do on election day. It would be, of course,
illegal for the software to differ, but it is readily possible to
conceal a double Trojan Horse, for example, such that it is highly
resistant to being found. It is not possible to verify that a piece
of software remains unchanged, if it were, the problem of viruses
would be solved since each program could self-verify whether or not
it had been changed. As stated in the classic computer paper
"Reflections on Trusting Trust" the only code you can trust is the
code you wrote yourself and know nobody else has accessed."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) says
electronic voting machines cannot be made secure.
Voting Foundation supports solutions for open voting. These
solutions include software using open standard specifications that
can be inspected by the public for flaws and even improved by the
public. The software must also capture and count votes in ways that
the voter can verify individually and would be statistically
impossible to tamper with on any significant scale.
Hacking the Vote
Clinton Curtis testimony on elections
the Judiciary Committee.